Universal Health Services, Inc.

The full register, from 13F filings

The Register tab above is hand research: a dozen holders, each traced to the filing it came from. This asks the same question of the whole market for the quarter ended 31-mar-2026, where 642 managers reported a position. Broad where the research is deep, and shallow in the ways a 13F always is.

Built from 13F filings, which report US listed, long, US custodied positions only. A register from this source is a floor rather than a level: a holder's true position can be far larger, as BlackRock's ASML stake shows at 1.28m shares in a 13F against 26.3m in its 13G/A. Holdings held through derivatives, outside US custody, or below a manager's reporting obligation do not appear. Where a holder is marked as a family, its total sums several separate filing entities and describes something no single filing describes; the constituent entities and their share counts are listed so the total can be checked. That roll-up can legitimately exceed the family's own Schedule 13G, because a 13G is filed by one legal entity: Vanguard reports Alphabet through ten advisory entities, and The Vanguard Group Inc itself reported zero after its January 2026 disaggregation.

What a reader needs to know to read these numbers

• FOUR-CLASS STRUCTURE, one basis chosen: shares_outstanding (58,936,515) is the TOTAL of Class A (6,574,600, unlisted), Class B (51,687,770, listed NYSE: UHS), Class C (661,688, unlisted) and Class D (12,457, unlisted), all from the 10-Q cover page dated 31 Jul 2026. Every class is convertible at any time into Class B on a one-for-one basis (10-K, Item 5, and DEF 14A footnote 2); no filing found here states differing dividend or liquidation rights across classes, so this file treats one share of any class as one economic unit and sums raw counts across all four classes as the single denominator for every register row's shares/pct_of_company. This is the SAME approach used for Ralph Lauren's two-class file, extended to four classes. Votes per share differ sharply and are recorded in share_classes/company-level notes only, never in shares/pct_of_company: Class A = 1 vote; Class B = 1/10 vote; Class C = 100 votes (conditional on the holder also holding Class A shares numbering at least 10x their Class C holding, else the excess Class C reverts to 1 vote/share); Class D = 10 votes (conditional on the holder also holding Class B shares numbering at least 10x their Class D holding, else the excess reverts to 1/10 vote/share). Source: UHS 10-K, Item 5.
• Institutional 13F holders hold Class B only (CUSIP 913903100). Each institutional row's pct_of_company divides Class B shares by the TOTAL-SHARES denominator (58,936,515), not by Class B alone (51,687,770); each row's method_note also states the higher percentage-of-Class-B-alone figure for reference, consistently about 14-20% higher than pct_of_company.
• Miller family control: Class A and Class C are almost entirely insider-held (per the 10-K, Class A had 12 holders of record and Class C had 1 holder of record as of 31 Jan 2026), and the 'All directors and executive officers as a group' row holds literally 100% of both classes. Alan B. Miller (Executive Chairman, founder's family) holds 22.94% of the company on the combined economic basis used here but 88.9% of general VOTING power (per the 2026 DEF 14A), driven by Class C's conditional 100-votes-per-share; his son Marc D. Miller (CEO, President, director) separately holds 6.00% economic / 2.3% voting. Economic ownership (shares/pct_of_company in this file) and voting power are different numbers by design and voting power is kept only in method_note/these notes, per the brief.
• Self-gate computed from this final file, using the chart's own arithmetic (members roll up into their container at full value in their own rows, the container they roll into is reduced by exactly that combined amount to its residual, everything else counts at full value): 11 register rows. Members map: Alan B. Miller (13,520,911 shares) and Marc D. Miller (3,533,955 shares) both roll into 'All directors and executive officers as a group (10 persons)'. Total = 13,520,911 (Alan B. Miller) + 3,533,955 (Marc D. Miller) + 6,336,822 (Vanguard family) + 4,554,670 (First Eagle) + 4,059,826 (BlackRock) + 2,102,613 (State Street) + 1,974,065 (Geode) + 1,951,147 (Invesco) + 1,416,755 (Fidelity) + 80,407 (T. Rowe Price Associates) + 703,680 (directors/officers group residual, i.e. the group's raw 17,758,546 minus the two named members) = 40,234,851 shares. Divided by shares_outstanding 58,936,515 = 68.27% of the company, on the total-shares basis.
• This 68.27% figure is well above the brief's 55% flag threshold and was checked for the usual causes of an inflated register before shipping: (1) mixed instrument/units: every institutional row is the same CUSIP 913903100 Class B common stock, read directly from each holder's own Q2 2026 13F-HR, cross-validated by a tight implied-price band of ~$148.50-148.69/share across all 8 institutional filers including the thousands-corrected T. Rowe Associates row; (2) mixed basis: the Miller family rows and the aggregate group are all on the same combined-4-class economic basis as every institutional row, with voting power kept out of the shares field entirely; (3) double counting: Alan B. Miller's and Marc D. Miller's rows use distinct trust footnotes with no shared footnote numbers between them, so they are not believed to overlap each other; Warren J. Nimetz was deliberately excluded as a separate row because 258,630 of his 377,530 reported Class A shares duplicate Alan B. Miller's own row (same Alan B. Miller 2002 Trust, footnote 17 on both men's lines), so including him would both double count that stake and misattribute disclaimed trustee shares as his own economic position; the aggregate container is reduced by exactly the two named members' combined total to reach its residual, avoiding a second double count against the 'group' row; Vanguard is one summed family row (parent filed 13F-NT, successors are the position, no double-add); Capital Group (4 registrants checked: Capital World Investors, Capital International Investors, Capital Research Global Investors, Capital Group Private Client Services) and T. Rowe Price Investment Management were checked and found to hold ZERO shares of UHS as of Q2 2026, so they contribute no phantom shares either way. The elevated total is a real, sourced feature of this company: it is a founder-controlled, multi-class structure where Class A and Class C are almost entirely insider-held (100% of each sits inside the officers/directors group per the proxy's own table) AND a deep sweep of 8 institutional Class B holders was completed, so both halves of the register are unusually comprehensively populated. This is the founder/multi-class case the brief anticipates running above the normal band, the same shape as the accepted Ralph Lauren file.
• Holdings side: UHS holds 787,543 shares (5.68%) of Universal Health Realty Income Trust (NYSE: UHT), a REIT it helped form in 1986, still serves as external Advisor to (0.70% of average invested real estate assets fee), and accounts for via the equity method. See the UHT holding row for sourcing.
• Searched the FY2025 10-K (filed 25 Feb 2026) and Q2 2026 10-Q (filed 7 Aug 2026) for 'equity method', 'joint venture', 'unconsolidated', 'investment in', 'noncontrolling interest', 'minority interest'. Beyond the UHT stake, UHS's Item 2 Properties table in the 10-K carries footnotes describing several hospital/facility-level ownership percentages, most of which are MAJORITY interests UHS holds with a minority third party holding the noncontrolling remainder (these are UHS-CONSOLIDATED subsidiaries, not UHS holdings, and are correctly excluded per the brief's rule on noncontrolling interests running the other way, e.g. footnotes describing UHS holding 93%, 80%, 51%, 52%, 70% interests with third parties holding the balance). A smaller number of footnotes describe UHS holding a genuine MINORITY (noncontrolling, equity-method) interest of approximately 50%, 50% and 30% in three unnamed facilities managed by a third party. These are real JV holdings but the flattened Item 2 property-table text returned by the filing tool could not be reliably mapped to specific facility or investee LEGAL entity names (the footnote markers sit far from the facility names in the table structure), so per the brief's rule against assigning unsized or unattributable figures to a specific investee, NO individual holding rows were created for these minority JV interests; they are recorded here as a qualitative finding only. Exhibit 21 (Subsidiaries of Registrant) was checked and is a BARE name-plus-state-of-incorporation list with no ownership-percentage column and no way to distinguish wholly owned subsidiaries from JV entities (the same 'Labcorp/Darden' shape the brief describes as a genuine negative), so it could not be used to size or name these JV interests either.
• Capital Group family swept across 4 registrants (Capital World Investors CIK 0001422849, Capital International Investors CIK 0001562230, Capital Research Global Investors CIK 0001422848, Capital Group Private Client Services, Inc. CIK 0001857666), all own Q2 2026 13F-HR information tables, filed 12 Aug 2026: no row in any of the four matches CUSIP 913903100 or 'UNIVERSAL HLTH SVCS'. No row recorded; this is a genuine negative rather than an omission. Not every one of the roughly eleven Capital Group registrants referenced elsewhere in this project was individually re-checked given the time budget; the 4 checked are believed the most likely to hold a large-cap US equity position.
• T. Rowe Price Investment Management, Inc. (CIK 0001897612) checked and found to hold NOTHING in UHS as of Q2 2026 (own 13F-HR, filed 14 Aug 2026, 738 rows, no match for the CUSIP). Only T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. (CIK 0000080255) holds a position; see its register row. Both T. Rowe registrants file 13F values in THOUSANDS, applied correctly.
• Market cap methodology: 58,936,515 total shares (31 Jul 2026 cover-page count, all four classes, since every class converts 1-for-1 into Class B) multiplied by a live Class B quote of $172.33 (Nasdaq API, 19 Aug 2026) = $10,156,529,630. This assumes Class A/C/D carry the same per-share economic value as Class B (inferred from the 1-for-1 conversion right; no filing found here states dividend/liquidation equality explicitly). This is a computed figure, not read directly off a single page stating market cap for all four classes together; the price date (19 Aug) and share-count date (31 Jul) do not exactly match because no single filing carries both.