Everest Group, Ltd.

The full register, from 13F filings

The Register tab above is hand research: a dozen holders, each traced to the filing it came from. This asks the same question of the whole market for the quarter ended 31-mar-2026, where 654 managers reported a position. Broad where the research is deep, and shallow in the ways a 13F always is.

Built from 13F filings, which report US listed, long, US custodied positions only. A register from this source is a floor rather than a level: a holder's true position can be far larger, as BlackRock's ASML stake shows at 1.28m shares in a 13F against 26.3m in its 13G/A. Holdings held through derivatives, outside US custody, or below a manager's reporting obligation do not appear. Where a holder is marked as a family, its total sums several separate filing entities and describes something no single filing describes; the constituent entities and their share counts are listed so the total can be checked. That roll-up can legitimately exceed the family's own Schedule 13G, because a 13G is filed by one legal entity: Vanguard reports Alphabet through ten advisory entities, and The Vanguard Group Inc itself reported zero after its January 2026 disaggregation.

What a reader needs to know to read these numbers

• Holdings side is EMPTY BY DESIGN. Searched the latest 10-Q (period 30 Jun 2026, filed 3 Aug 2026) and the latest 10-K (period 31 Dec 2025, filed 26 Feb 2026) for 'equity method', 'joint venture', 'unconsolidated', 'strategic investment', 'investment in unconsolidated', 'non-marketable equity', and 'affiliate'. Every 'equity method' hit in both filings refers exclusively to Everest's general-account investment portfolio: limited partnership interests ($5.5bn at 31 Dec 2025, $5.1bn at 31 Dec 2024 per the 10-K) accounted for under the equity method with results flowing through net investment income, plus corporate-owned life insurance (COLI, $2.0bn at 30 Jun 2026) carried at cash surrender value. This is precisely the insurer general-account portfolio the brief instructs to exclude: it is not a set of strategic corporate stakes, the filings never name an individual limited partnership or underlying investee, and no dollar figure is assignable to any single fund. 'joint venture' and 'unconsolidated' return zero hits in either filing. 'strategic investment' returns one hit, about investing in employee talent, unrelated to equity holdings. All 'affiliate' hits describe Everest's own corporate structure (its pending sale of Everest Canada/EUGIL to a third-party Buyer, and Longtail Re, a Stone Ridge Capital-affiliated retrocessionaire that reinsures Everest's own liabilities under a reinsurance treaty) rather than an equity stake Everest holds in another operating company.
• Exhibit 21.1 of the FY2025 10-K was read in full: it is a bare list of 41 wholly-owned Everest subsidiary names and jurisdictions of incorporation with NO ownership-percentage column and no joint-venture or minority-stake entities listed, the same negative pattern the brief describes for Labcorp and Darden. Treated as a genuine negative, consistent with the rest of the search: there is no equity-method investee or strategic stake anywhere in Everest's own disclosures.
• UNUSUAL BERMUDA-INCORPORATION FEATURE, deliberately excluded from the register: Everest Re Advisors, Ltd., a Bermuda-domiciled, direct WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY of Everest Group, Ltd. itself, held 9,719,971 Common Shares of its own parent as of 31 Dec 2025 (10-K risk-factor disclosure and 2026 DEF 14A 5%-owner table), which the FY2025 10-K states was 19.3% of shares outstanding on that measurement basis (the proxy's own intro paragraph, using a March 2026 record date, gives 19.5% against a differently-dated denominator). Under Everest's Bermuda bye-laws, any shareholder's voting power is capped at 9.9% of total voting power, so Re Advisors can vote only 9.9% despite its larger economic/beneficial stake. This is legally distinct from Everest's ordinary GAAP treasury-share buybacks, but in CONSOLIDATED GAAP accounting a subsidiary's holding of its own parent's stock is presented within the same 'Treasury shares, at cost' balance-sheet line (33.7 million shares at 31 Dec 2025, $4,906 million at cost) that also contains Everest's directly-repurchased treasury shares; the two are not separately broken out on the face of the balance sheet. This project's shares_outstanding field (38,342,734, the 10-Q cover-page figure) is Everest's NET GAAP shares outstanding, i.e. it is computed AFTER this treasury-share deduction and therefore already excludes Re Advisors' 9.7 million shares. Including Re Advisors as a register row against that same denominator would divide a numerator the denominator has already netted out, producing a nonsensical and misleadingly large percentage (roughly 25% against a base that structurally cannot contain those shares). It is reported here in notes rather than as a row for that reason. This is exactly the kind of thing the brief asks to flag about Bermuda incorporation: it does not change the register arithmetic used here, but it is a materially important fact about who can actually control Everest's votes, since Re Advisors' capped 9.9% voting block is nearly as large as Vanguard's, BlackRock's and State Street's combined economic stakes.
• No Schedule 13D or 13G has been filed against Everest Group (CIK 0001095073) since 8 Nov 2024 (a Wellington Management 13G), per EDGAR's own filing history for the company checked directly. No activist or sovereign holder was found. Per the brief's guidance to prefer the fresher 13F over a stale 13G/13D quoted in a proxy, this register uses fresh Q2 2026 13F-derived figures throughout for the institutional rows; BlackRock's fresh Q2 2026 13F (3,220,769 sh, 8.4%) is actually LOWER than the 2026 DEF 14A's Schedule-13G-sourced figure (3,832,094 sh, 7.7% stated in the proxy against its own denominator), confirming the brief's warning that the stale-vs-fresh correction does not always run one direction. Wellington's fresh Q2 2026 13F (470,633 sh, 1.23%) is similarly well below its own Nov 2024 13G level, a genuine decline in position rather than a data error.
• Capital Group family: swept ALL ELEVEN registrants (per this project's own guidance on the full family size), enumerated via EDGAR company search rather than the truncated data/registers/EG.json top-40 (which does not list Capital Group at all): Capital World Investors 0001422849, Capital International Investors 0001562230, Capital Research Global Investors 0001422848, Capital International, Inc./CA 0000895213, Capital Group Investment Management Pte. Ltd. 0001939970, Capital Group Private Client Services, Inc. 0001857666, Capital International Sarl 0001065349, Capital International Ltd /CA/ 0001065350 (all 8 filed Q2 2026 Form 13F-HR and were checked directly for CUSIP G3223R108: NONE holds a position), plus three umbrella registrants, Capital Group Companies, Inc. 0000732812, Capital Research and Management Company 0000017283 and Capital Group International, Inc. 0000949308, which all filed Form 13F-NT (no holdings) for Q2 2026. This is a genuine, fully-checked negative: Capital Group holds no Everest Group position as of 30 Jun 2026. Recorded here per the brief's rule that a holder confirmed to hold nothing is a note, not a null row.
• T. Rowe Price: both required registrants checked. T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. (CIK 0000080255) holds 97,850 shares, reported in its own 13F-HR VALUES IN THOUSANDS (confirmed via the implied-price check, matching the $357.23/sh consensus only when the raw filing value is multiplied by 1,000). T. Rowe Price Investment Management, Inc. (CIK 0001897612) holds no Everest position.
• Implied per-share price cross-check across every institutional row: $357.23-357.30/sh for Vanguard's 8 entities, BlackRock, State Street, AQR, Vulcan Value Partners, Barrow Hanley, MFS (on 5 of its 8 lines), Invesco, Wellington and T. Rowe Price (after correcting for the thousands convention), all independently dated 30 Jun 2026. Two exceptions are flagged on their own rows rather than silently smoothed: Geode is a modest outlier at $355.92/sh, within normal cross-filer noise; AllianceBernstein is a real outlier at $326.85/sh (about 8.5% below consensus), confirmed against the raw filing XML rather than a parsing error on this end, and MFS carries 3 of its 8 lines with implausible per-share values (a known MFS filing artifact already documented on this project's Humana file). No row shows the classic 1000x values-in-thousands error except T. Rowe Price, which is expected and corrected.
• Self-gate, computed from this final file exactly as the chart computes it (13 rows; the directors/executive-officers aggregate has no member rows marked rolls_up_into it, so it counts at full value; nothing else is an aggregate): 13 register rows, 18,471,142 total shares, against shares_outstanding 38,342,734 = 48.17% of the company. This sits within the brief's expected roughly-25%-to-45% band (slightly above it but well short of the 55% flag threshold), consistent with Everest being a widely institutionally-held large-cap insurer with no dual-class structure and no dominant founder/family block in the externally-held share count. The Everest Re Advisors subsidiary holding (see above) is excluded from this total for the denominator-consistency reason given there; including it would push the raw total far higher but against a mismatched base, which is exactly the kind of arithmetic error this self-gate exists to catch.
• Everest is Bermuda-incorporated (Everest Group, Ltd., a Bermuda company) but files as a US domestic filer (10-K/10-Q/DEF 14A, not 20-F/6-K), which is why the same SEC filing tooling used elsewhere in this project applies cleanly here. The one substantive effect of the Bermuda structure observed in this research is the Re Advisors voting-cap mechanism described above; no other adjustment to the arithmetic was required.