Charles River Laboratories International, Inc.

The full register, from 13F filings

The Register tab above is hand research: a dozen holders, each traced to the filing it came from. This asks the same question of the whole market for the quarter ended 31-mar-2026, where 549 managers reported a position. Broad where the research is deep, and shallow in the ways a 13F always is.

Built from 13F filings, which report US listed, long, US custodied positions only. A register from this source is a floor rather than a level: a holder's true position can be far larger, as BlackRock's ASML stake shows at 1.28m shares in a 13F against 26.3m in its 13G/A. Holdings held through derivatives, outside US custody, or below a manager's reporting obligation do not appear. Where a holder is marked as a family, its total sums several separate filing entities and describes something no single filing describes; the constituent entities and their share counts are listed so the total can be checked. That roll-up can legitimately exceed the family's own Schedule 13G, because a 13G is filed by one legal entity: Vanguard reports Alphabet through ten advisory entities, and The Vanguard Group Inc itself reported zero after its January 2026 disaggregation.

What a reader needs to know to read these numbers

• Holdings side: searched the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q (period ended 27 Jun 2026, the freshest filing, filed 5 Aug 2026) and the FY2025 Form 10-K (filed 18 Feb 2026) for 'equity method', 'venture capital', 'non-marketable equity', 'equity investments', 'joint venture', 'unrealized gain' and 'equity securities'. Charles River carries ONE combined balance sheet line, 'Venture capital and strategic equity investments', $206,470 thousand as of 27 Jun 2026 (Note 9 of the 10-Q; $206,972 thousand at 27 Dec 2025). This line has two disclosed sub-components, neither of which names or sizes an individual investee: (a) 'Venture capital investments', a roll-forward-disclosed sub-balance of $133,373 thousand as of 27 Jun 2026, being Charles River's LP/LLC interests in SEVERAL venture capital FUNDS that in turn invest in start-up life-sciences companies; the 10-K states the Company's ownership interest in these FUNDS (not in the underlying portfolio companies) ranges from less than 1% to approximately 20%, and total fund commitments were $234.3 million as of 27 Dec 2025, of which $184.9 million was funded; (b) 'strategic equity investments', the implied remainder (approximately $73.1 million as of 27 Jun 2026), being direct minority equity stakes in predominantly privately held life-sciences companies, measured at fair value or under the equity method as appropriate, with equity investments lacking readily determinable fair value carried under the ASC 321 measurement alternative (cost minus impairment). No individual fund or portfolio company is named anywhere in either filing. Per the project's rule against assigning a combined balance to any one investee, and because no single investee is even named here (unlike a case such as a specifically identified joint venture), holdings is left as an EMPTY ARRAY rather than carrying a placeholder row for an unnamed bucket; the combined figures are recorded here instead.
• Exhibit 21 (FY2025 10-K) was checked for an ownership-percentage column: it is a bare two-column list (subsidiary name, jurisdiction of organization) with no percentage column anywhere, a genuine negative, not evidence of looking in the wrong place.
• PathoQuest SAS: Charles River previously held a 21% strategic equity interest in PathoQuest (part of the venture capital and strategic equity investments balance, unsized). On 9 Jan 2026 the Company exercised its option to acquire the remaining approximately 79% equity interest for EUR 51.6 million (approximately $60.0 million), making PathoQuest a wholly owned subsidiary as of the Q2 2026 10-Q. Wholly owned operating subsidiaries are excluded from holdings per the research brief, so no row is carried for PathoQuest; this is noted because it explains the one instance where the 10-K/10-Q name a specific prior minority investee by name, even though it is no longer a current minority holding.
• Register self-gate, computed on this final file exactly as the chart computes it: 11 distinct institutional rows (Vanguard 5,800,986; FMR/Fidelity 4,239,752; BlackRock 3,798,560; Invesco 2,984,785; Harris Associates 2,241,144; Allspring 1,905,247; State Street 1,864,284; Ariel Investments 1,506,185; T. Rowe Price Associates 1,505,370; Dimensional 1,648,450; Wellington 1,288,463) sum to 28,783,226 shares, counted at full value. James C. Foster (a member row, rolls_up_into the officers/directors container) counts at full value: 361,012. The 'All current executive officers and directors as a group' container (660,726 raw) is reduced to its residual (660,726 minus Foster's 361,012 = 299,714) because it has one named member. Elliott Investment Management is unsized (shares: null) and contributes 0 to this arithmetic. Total = 28,783,226 + 361,012 + 299,714 = 29,443,952 shares against 47,738,872 shares outstanding = 61.68%. Row count: 14 rows total in this array (11 institutional, 2 insider, 1 modelled strategic), matching the actual length of the register array in this file.
• The 61.68% self-gate is above the brief's rough 55% ceiling, so it was corroborated per the project's post-chunk-44 guidance rather than shipped on implied-price consistency alone. Per-holder check: every one of the 11 institutional rows corresponds to a DISTINCT filer family (different CIK, no overlap) that this project's own independent 31-Mar-2026 register snapshot (data/registers/CRL.json) also reports at the same order of magnitude: Vanguard 5,946,608 (snapshot) vs 5,800,986 (this file); BlackRock 3,859,100 vs 3,798,560; Fidelity/FMR 3,456,244 vs 4,239,752; Invesco 2,397,252 vs 2,984,785; Harris Associates 2,153,296 vs 2,241,144; Allspring 1,993,316 vs 1,905,247; State Street 1,873,618 vs 1,864,284; Dimensional 1,652,484 vs 1,648,450; Wellington 1,629,401 vs 1,288,463; Ariel Investments 1,444,183 vs 1,506,185; T. Rowe (Associates CIK) 1,125,143 vs 1,505,370. No row is a duplicate of another or an order-of-magnitude mismatch. Denominator check: the snapshot's own total_shares_reported across all 549 filers is 57,607,049, which is 120.7% of the 47,738,872 shares outstanding used in this file; a ratio over 100% is characteristic of 13F double counting through nested funds and sub-advisers (the same phenomenon documented elsewhere in this project), and it confirms Charles River is a heavily institutionally held company where a top-11-institution concentration in the 55 to 65% range is plausible rather than a sign of a double-counted holder.
• Vanguard: parent CIK 0000102909 filed Form 13F-NT (no holdings) for Q2 2026, so the 8 standard successor entities were swept individually; 7 of the 8 held a Charles River position (Vanguard National Trust Co, CIK 0001984256, was checked and found to hold none). See the Vanguard row's method_note for the full per-entity breakdown.
• Capital Group family: all three primary registrants were checked individually against their own Q2 2026 13F-HR (Capital World Investors CIK 0001422849: 14,039 sh, $3,183,905; Capital International Investors CIK 0001562230: checked, no CRL position; Capital Research Global Investors CIK 0001422848: checked, no CRL position). The family total is only 14,039 shares (0.03% of the company), immaterial relative to the top-11 list above, so no Capital Group row is carried in the register; this is recorded here so the omission reads as a checked-and-found-small result, not an unchecked gap.
• T. Rowe Price: both registrants were checked. T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. (CIK 0000080255) holds 1,505,370 shares and is carried as a row (see its method_note for the values-in-thousands correction applied to the raw filing). T. Rowe Price Investment Management, Inc. (CIK 0001897612), the separate registrant flagged elsewhere in this project as sometimes holding the larger or the 5%-proxy-cited position, was checked against its own Q2 2026 13F-HR and holds NO Charles River position; checked and found at zero, no row carried for that entity.
• Activist/strategic holder: Elliott Investment Management is the activist referenced in the research brief. Charles River entered a Cooperation Agreement with the Elliott Parties on 6 May 2025 that placed four Elliott-nominated directors on the board (Steven Barg, Mark Enyedy, Abraham Ceesay, Paul Graves), all of whom remain directors per the 31 Mar 2026 DEF 14A. Elliott has never filed a Schedule 13D or 13G on Charles River and shows no reportable common-stock position on its own Q1 2026 or Q2 2026 Form 13F-HR, consistent with the Cooperation Agreement's own text, which caps Elliott at 9.9% beneficial ownership of Common Stock but allows up to 19.9% 'aggregate net-long economic exposure' via swaps and other derivatives that are not 13F- or 13(d)-reportable. Elliott is therefore classified as a real, current strategic holder with board influence, but its position is modelled from the Cooperation Agreement's contractual ownership bounds (3.0% floor tied to board-seat retention, 9.9% beneficial-ownership ceiling) rather than sourced from any single filed share count. This is NOT a confirmed exit, so it is carried as a row (with basis modelled/confidence estimated) rather than only as a note.
• No em dashes used in any text field per house style.
• Coordinator verification of the 61.68 per cent self-gate, above the project's 55 per cent line, and of the one modelled row, which is the row type most able to corrupt a chart. Corroborated per holder against this project's own 13F-derived snapshot at data/registers/CRL.json, built from 549 filers at 31 Mar 2026 and independent of the filings read here; every institutional row matches a distinct filer family at the same order of magnitude. That snapshot reports 57.6 million shares against 47,738,872 outstanding, roughly 120.7 per cent, which is well above the whole company and is the documented 13F over-reporting effect where an adviser and a sub-adviser report the same shares under two CIKs. It confirms Charles River is effectively wholly institutionally held, so a top-fourteen at 61.68 per cent is consistent rather than anomalous, and the over-100 figure is evidence about the snapshot rather than about this curated file, which counts each family once. The Elliott Investment Management row is modelled and is handled correctly in the one way that matters: `shares` and `pct_of_company` are BOTH null, so the row contributes exactly nothing to the charted total of 29,443,952, while the estimate lives in `low_shares` 1,432,166 and `high_shares` 4,726,148. Those bounds were re-derived here and are exactly 3.0 and 9.9 per cent of the 47,738,872 shares outstanding, matching the floor tied to board-seat retention and the beneficial-ownership cap in the May 2025 Cooperation Agreement. This is the correct treatment for a holder that is genuinely present but genuinely unsized: Elliott has never filed a Schedule 13D or 13G on this company and reports no position in its own Q1 or Q2 2026 13F, consistent with exposure held through derivatives that fall outside both reporting regimes, so no filed figure exists anywhere to be found. A point estimate written into `shares` would have inflated the chart with an invented number that every automated gate would have passed.